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Death is a short but meaningful word. Its denotation is simple:
"the cessation of life;"1 its connotations are complex and range from
grim images of grief to pleasant visions of a peaceful afterlife.
Although what happens to a decedent's soul at death is only faithfully
surmised, the disposition of a decedent's property is precisely deter-
mined from the laws of contracts, wills, trusts, and estates.
This Note focuses not on those who carefully plan the disposition
of their estates, but on those whose failure to plan-either in the en-
tirety or in an effective manner-triggers application of the laws of
intestate succession.2 The problems associated with intestacy statutes
are significant because most people are involved with inheritance at
some time, and thus no area of private law more concerns the public
than intestate succession.3
Despite their significance, intestacy laws have developed in a
seemingly ad hoc fashion, varying widely within and among countries
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1. BLAcr 's LAW DIcnoNARY 400 (6th ed. 1990).
2. "A succession is called 'intestate' when the deceased has left no will or when his
will has been revoked or annulled as irregular." Id. at 821. "Any part of the estate of a
decedent not effectively disposed of by will passes to the decedent's heirs as prescribed [by
the laws of intestate succession]." CAL. PROB. CODE § 6400 (West 1993).
3. UNIF. PROB. CODE 5 (Third Working Draft 1967) [hereinafter UPC DRAFr] (re-
marks by Richard V. Wellman, Project Director, Uniform Probate Code Project, Before
Committee of the Whole, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
Honolulu, Hawaii, on Friday, August 4, 1967).
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throughout history.4 This variability is particularly apparent in the
United States, where federalism has fostered the adoption of widely
diverse intestacy provisions. This Note focuses specifically upon pro-
visions that prescribe the share of heirs other than the surviving
spouse because in many states these provisions dispose of more than
half of an intestate's property.5 The diversity of these provisions indi-
cates that the ad hoc legislative approach currently used fails to ensure
that all of the goals underlying intestacy statutes are promoted uni-
formly among jurisdictions.
This Note proposes a model intestacy statute to govern distribu-
tion to heirs who are not the surviving spouse. The statute attempts to
strike the optimal balance of the many goals and attendant policies
that underlie modern intestacy schemes.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the laws of intestate
succession, focusing on when and to whose estates intestacy provisions
apply. Part II evaluates the goals underlying modern intestacy
schemes. Finally, Part III proposes a model intestacy provision for
heirs other than the surviving spouse that satisfies these modern intes-
tacy goals. Before proceeding toward that end, it is appropriate to set
the stage by examining when and to whose estates intestacy provisions
most often apply.
6
Io When and to Whose Estates Intestacy Provisions Apply
A. When Do Intestacy Provisions Apply?
Intestacy provisions apply in a variety of situations that, from a
testate or intestate decedent's viewpoint, may be thoughtfully planned
or purely accidental.7 For instance, a testate decedent may devise all
or part of her estate to "my next of kin as though I had died intes-
4. For a historical examination of inheritance laws in various countries, see generally
FAMILY AND INHERITANCE: RURAL SOCIETY IN WESTERN EUROPE 1200-1800 (Jack
Goody et al. eds., 1976). For a discussion of the effects of twentieth-century changes in
Western marriage and family upon inheritance and intestacy, see generally MARY ANN
GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY (1981).
5. For example, in California the share of heirs who are not the surviving spouse
equals either: the entire intestate estate if there is no surviving spouse; one-half of the
intestate estate when the decedent leaves either one child, issue of one deceased child, or
parent(s) or their issue; or two-thirds of the intestate estate when the decedent leaves
either more than one child, one child and issue of one or more deceased children, or issue
of two or more deceased children. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6401-02 (West 1993).
6. For a general discussion of the law of intestate succession, see MARVIN B. Suss-
MAN ET AL., THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 16-23 (1970).
7. An intestacy scheme applies not only at the direction of a testate decedent who
adopts such a scheme as his will, but also at the direction of a probate court when a dece-
dent dies intestate-either purposefully by deliberately not making a will or accidentally
by failing to make any will or failing to make a will that complies with applicable laws.
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tate."8 Similarly, an intestate decedent may knowingly rely upon her
state's intestacy scheme as representative of her dispositive wishes.9
In contrast, a decedent may die wholly10 or partially" intestate be-
8. For an overview of relevant case law, see Annotation, Term "Next of Kin" Used in
Will as Referring to Those Who Would Take in Cases of Intestacy Under Distribution Stat-
utes, or to Nearest Blood Relatives of Designated Person or Persons, 32 A.L.R. 2D 296
(1994).
9. This possibility was acknowledged in UNx. PROB. CODE § 2-101 commentary at
43 (1991).
However, this possibility was characterized as remote in a telephone survey of 750
persons living in Alabama, California, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Texas that aimed at dis-
cerning the distributive preferences of intestate decedents. Mary Louise Fellows et al.,
Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the
United States, 1978 Am. B. FoUND. RES. J. 321, 339-40 & n.73. The survey results indicated
that "most citizens do not know who will inherit their property and are not relying on
existing intestacy statutes." Id. at 340.
Similar results appeared in a study of Iowans' dispositive preferences conducted at
approximately the same time as the Fellows study. Contemporary Studies Project, A Com-
parison of Iowans' Dispositive Preferences with Selected Provisions of the Iowa and Uni-
form Probate Codes, 63 IowA L. REv. 1041, 1076-78 (1978). In that study, interviewees
were divided into two groups: (1) survivors of intestate decedents who were presumed to
be somewhat familiar with Iowa's intestacy scheme because of their experience with the
intestate distribution of a relative's estate and (2) citizens of Iowa generally. Id. at 1045,
1077. Dramatically, only 25% of the survivor interviewees and 13% of the citizen inter-
viewees "indicated that they felt no need for a will, either because state law would ade-
quately dispose of their property or because they believed that their family would get the
property automatically." Id. at 1077.
Likewise, results of a study of records of 223 decedent estate administrations in Wash-
tenaw County, Michigan revealed that "slightly less than one half of all decedents leaving
estates of sufficient size to be administered by other than summary procedures were con-
tent to let the intestate law take its course." Olin L. Browder, Jr., Recent Patterns of Testate
Succession in the United States and England, 67 MicH. L. REv. 1303, 1304, 1313 (1969).
See also Paul L. Sayre, Recent Ideologies in the Law of Succession to Property, 32 Li
L. REv. 691, 699 (1938) (observing that "[i]ntentional intestacy of large estates is surely
rare"). Cf John H. Beckstrom, Sociobiology and Intestate Wealth Transfers, 76 Nw. U. L.
Rnv. 216, 231 & n.53 (1981) (stating that he personally had no will for many years in
reliance upon the laws of intestacy as the way he wished his property to pass at his death).
10. Failures resulting in total intestacy often result from: (1) laziness, see Fellows et
al., supra note 9, at 339; (2) not getting around to making a will, see Contemporary Studies
Project, supra note 9, at 1077; or (3) failure to conform to the formalities required for the
valid execution of a testamentary instrument. See Russell Niles, Probate Reform in Cali-
fornia, 31 HASTINGs LJ. 185, 209-10 (1979). See also California Law Revision Commis-
sion, Tentative Recommendation Relating to Wills and Intestate Succession, 16 CAL. L.
REviSION CoMM'N REPS. 2305, 2318 (1982) (noting that California law contains technical
requirements that often invalidate wills).
For a general discussion of execution requirements, see SussmAN Er AL., supra note 6,
at 23-25. For current examples of execution requirements, see CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6110-
13 (West 1993).
11. Failures resulting in partial intestacy may occur for a variety of reasons, including
failure of a will to dispose of all probate assets. Fellows et al., supra note 9, at 322 n.5. In




cause she unintentionally failed to make a comprehensive and valid
will.
It has been noted that the role that inheritance law plays in family
wealth transmission is ever-dwindling because family wealth increas-
ingly is passed on through lifetime transfers such as educational and
other assistance from parent to child, survivorship arrangements, life
insurance between spouses,12 and pension plans. Although this may
be true, many decedents do not alienate all of their assets prior to
their deaths.13 As a result, total or partial intestacy can and often does
occur despite the apparent frequency of lifetime transfers. 14
B. To Whose Estates Do Intestacy Provisions Apply?
Most studies of wealth transmission at death focus on testate
rather than intestate distribution. Consequently, the characteristics of
typical intestate decedents must be inferred from the characteristics of
testate decedents that are described in legal commentary and various
empirical studies.
According to one law professor, "[a] modem picture of will-mak-
ing clients is a picture of people embattled by a system. Many of them
speak to lawyers of their interest in wills as a matter of seeking protec-
tion... [from] the machinery of probate."'15 This characterization of
will-making clients as protection-seekers is consistent with the find-
ings of a 1978 study of Iowans that revealed that "[t]hose persons who
make a will and thus avoid intestate distribution of their property tend
to be older and wealthier than the typical intestate, and also are more
likely to be married or widowed."'1 6 Persons with these characteristics
seemingly have more reason to seek protection from the uncertainties
of probate than do their younger, less affluent, never-married
counterparts.
12. See MARY ANN GLENDON, TIHE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE,
LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 238-39 (1989).
13. But see Contemporary Studies Project, supra note 9, at 1068 ("As a result of joint
property and life insurance ownership, significant portions or even all of a decedent's es-
tate can be distributed without being subject to the state probate statutes.").
14. In fact, all three of the major empirical studies that have investigated the number
of people dying intestate have determined that more people die intestate than testate.
John W. Fisher II & Scott A. Curnutte, Reforming the Law of Intestate Succession and
Elective Shares: New Solutions to Age-Old Problems, 93 W. VA. L. REv. 61, 72 (1990)
(citing Allison Dunham, The Method, Process, and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at
Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 241 (1963); Contemporary Studies Project, supra note 9; and
Fellows et al., supra note 9). See also SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 62-69 & 62 n.2
(discussing the proportion of testate cases in various jurisdictions).
15. Thomas L. Shaffer, Death, Property and Ideals, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY
PROPERTY 26, 30 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr., ed., 1977).
16. Contemporary Studies Project, supra note 9, at 1066-67.
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In addition, a 1963 study of 500 Chicagoans revealed that women
were somewhat more likely than men to die testate,17 and skilled
workers such as craftsmen, operators, sales workers, and clericals
were substantially less likely to die testate than were Chicagoans in
the sample as a whole.'8 Similarly, a 1978 telephone survey of 750
persons living in Alabama, California, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Texas
found that the greater the interviewee's family income, estate size,
age, or educational level, the more likely he or she was to have a
will.' 9 Finally, interviewees in the 1978 telephone survey who were
employed in nonlabor occupations were more likely than those in blue
or white collar occupations to have a will, and interviewees with all
adult children were far more likely to have a will than those with no
children or some minor children. 20 Therefore, intestate decedents ap-
pear somewhat more likely than testate decedents to be young, nonaf-
fluent, and uneducated.
H. By What Criteria Should Intestacy Statutes be Judged?
Before examining this Note's proposal for a model intestacy pro-
vision for heirs other than the surviving spouse, it is necessary to un-
derstand the goals behind modem intestacy schemes because these
goals define the criteria for the proposed statute. Specific intestacy
goals discussed in this Part include fostering simplicity, comprehensi-
bility, and uniformity of intestacy statutes;2' allowing an intestate's
"deserving" relatives by consanguinity and affinity to take by intes-
tacy;2 satisfying a decedent's presumed intentions and society's inter-
ests;23 limiting delays, expenses, and liabilities associated with the
personal representative's duties of locating and notifying prospective
heirs; and avoiding frequent escheat to the state.25
A. General Criteria
Generally, an intestacy statute should be clear, simple, and com-
prehensible,26 which means that it should govern only the more com-
monly encountered situations. Thus, inheritance by persons who are
close but not related by blood or marriage to an intestate, such as
same or opposite sex living companions, should be determined by the
17. But see ic at 1076.
18. Dunham, supra note 14, at 248-49.
19. Fellows et al., supra note 9, at 336-39.
20. 1& at 338.
21. See infra Parts ll.A and ll.E.
22. See infra Part II.B.1-2.
23. See infra Part lI.A.
24. See infra Part I.C.
25. See infra Part II.D.
26. Niles, supra note 10, at 200.
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individual decedent. It seems likely that a decedent with such a rela-
tionship is more inclined than an average decedent to realize that her
situation is unique and that therefore a will is not only appropriate but
also necessary for fulfilling her dispositive preferences. Consequently,
an intestacy statute need not and should not attempt to cover all of
the complex alternatives that might be expected to be covered by indi-
vidual wills.
In addition to providing clarity, simplicity, and comprehensibility,
it is generally agreed27 that an intestacy statute should provide an in-
heritance pattern that the "average decedent probably would have
wanted if an intention had been expressed by will."' 8 Despite this
general agreement, however, legislators should recognize that "the
desires of normal or average decedents do not provide the sole basis
for framing or justifying an intestacy [statute]. '2 9 In fact, satisfying a
decedent's presumed intentions seems relatively unimportant in com-
parison to more compelling goals of intestacy schemes, such as pro-
ducing a fair pattern of distribution among surviving family members
and serving society's interests.
30
Producing a fair pattern of distribution among surviving family
members involves creating a pattern "that the recipients believe is fair
27. This general agreement is by no means universal, however. See Mark L. Ascher,
The 1990 Uniform Probate Code: Older and Better, Or More like the Internal Revenue
Code?, 77 MINN. L. REv. 639, 641 (1993):
I would prefer to see the UPC pay more attention to "living" values, such as
simplicity and certainty, than to "dead" values, such as incremental improvements
in effectuating a decedent's intent. I am less interested in a system that seeks to
carry out a decedent's intent (particularly where the decedent has never bothered
to express that intent) than in a system that simply and without litigation disposes
of a decedent's assets.
28. Id. Accord King v. Riffee, 309 S.E.2d 85, 87-88 (W. Va. 1983); STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA, THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE: ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE 29-30 (1973)
[hereinafter UPC CRITIQUE]; LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS
ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 71 (1991); Thomas E. Atkinson, Succession
Among Collaterals, 20 IowA L. REv. 185, 187 (1935); Allison Dunham, supra note 14, at
241; Fellows et al., supra note 9, at 323; Contemporary Studies Project, supra note 9, at
1043-44; and California Law Revision Commission, supra note 10, at 2318.
See also UNIF. PROB. CODE, supra note 9, at 40-41 (stating that "[iln the twenty or so
years between the original promulgation of the Code and the 1990 revisions .... [a] decline
of formalism in favor of intent-serving policies [had occurred]"); Margaret M. Mahoney,
Stepfamilies in the Law of Intestate Succession and Wills, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 917, 939
(1989) (stating that "[t]he focus in the law of descent is on the property owner and not on
the expectations of surviving family members").
See generally Beckstrom, supra note 9 (arguing that legislators should consider soci-
obiological theory when inferring a decedent's dispositive intent).
29. Browder, supra note 9, at 1313.
30. See Fellows et al., supra note 9, at 324 ("If society's well-being requires a distribu-
tive pattern different from the determined wishes of intestate decedents, the decedents'
wishes should be subordinated.").
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and thus does not produce disharmony within the surviving family
members [n]or disdain for the legal system. ' 31 Despite the obvious
desirability of creating such a pattern, it has been observed that "[t]he
focus in the law of descent is on the property owner and not on the
expectations of the surviving family members. '3 2 Nevertheless, the
viewpoints of a decedent's relatives should be considered during the
creation of an intestacy scheme because "[a] major concern of any
probate legislation or dispositive system is justice and fairness for the
successors. ' 33 Intuitively, this seems true even though "any participa-
tion in the estate of a deceased person is by grace of the sovereign
power which alone has any natural or inherent right to succeed to
such property." 4
Serving society's interests involves creating a pattern of distribu-
tion that is designed: "(1) to protect the financially dependent family;
(2) to avoid complicating property ties and excessive subdivision of
property; (3) to promote and encourage the nuclear family; and (4) to
encourage the accumulation of property by individuals. 35 Although
each of these aims is important, this Note's proposal focuses upon the
first aim, protecting the financially dependent family,36 because this
aim best serves society's interests. Protection of financially dependent
family members benefits not only an intestate's dependents who in-
herit under well-crafted intestacy statutes, but also other family mem-
bers and the public at large, upon whom the burden of supporting the
dependents would otherwise fall if the statutes did not adequately per-
mit dependents to inherit.37
While striving to meet these goals of clarity, simplicity, and com-
prehensibility and satisfaction for intestates, their survivors, and soci-
ety, legislators should recognize that intestacy statutes also affect the
interpretation of wills and trusts. These instruments often make gifts
to the "heirs" or "next of kin" of the donor or some other specified
person. In such cases, the takers may be defined as those who would
31. WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 28, at 71.
32. Mahoney, supra note 28, at 939.
33. Eugene F. Scoles, Probate Reform, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY,
supra note 15, at 149.
34. 16 AM. JUR. Descent and Distribution § 12 (1938) (cited with approval in McFad-
den v. Norton, 69 S.E.2d 445 (Va. 1952), which is quoted in King v. Riffee, 309 S.E.2d 85,
88 (W. Va. 1983)).
35. Fellows et al., supra note 9, at 324.
36. See infra Part III.B.2.
37. For a brief historical examination of English family maintenance provisions au-
thorizing courts to provide an allowance for the family of a testator who did not adequately
provide such an allowance in his will, see JOHN RrrcH-E ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS
ON DECEDENT'S ESTATES AND TRUSTS 23 (1993).
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succeed to the property under the appropriate intestacy statute.
38
Thus, the needs of not only intestate decedents but also those of tes-
tate decedents, the survivors of intestate and testate decedents, and
society must be carefully considered during the drafting of an intes-
tacy statute.
B. Capacity for Allowing Deserving Relatives to Take
Above all, an intestacy statute should have a strong capacity for
allowing a decedent's deserving relatives to inherit because such a ca-
pacity is consonant with the fairness that intestates, surviving family
members, society, and legislators undoubtedly desire from intestate
succession. The particular group of relatives thought to be deserving
varies widely among jurisdictions and may include all, some, or many
of a decedent's relatives by consanguinity or affinity.
(1) Relatives by Consanguinity
A decedent's relatives by consanguinity 39 include her descend-
ants,40 her ancestors, 4' and her collaterals.42 Consanguinity forms the
basis for nearly all American intestacy schemes.43 The overwhelming
importance of consanguinity in the law of intestacy probably stems
from traditional perceptions of the desirability of passing property
along blood lines. Although the importance of consanguinity is undis-
puted, a burning question remains: How far should intestate succes-
sion by consanguinity extend among collaterals? In other words,
which of a decedent's collateral relatives are deserving enough to take
by intestacy? This question has been debated time and time again,
with sharp and widespread disagreement among jurisdictions and
among legal commentators.
38. Niles, supra note 10, at 200. See also supra note 8 and accompanying text (regard-
ing devises made to next of kin).
39. Consanguinity means "[k]inship; blood relationship; the connection or relation of
persons descended from the same stock or common ancestor." BLACK'S LAW DICriONARY
303 (6th ed. 1990).
40. "The term 'descendants' (or 'issue') denotes a multiple-generation class, which
includes not only children, but also grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and so on all the
way down the descending line." WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 28, at 79.
41. Ancestors are those "from whom a person lineally descended or may be de-
scended." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 84 (6th ed. 1990).
42. "A collateral relative is a blood relative [of the decedent] who shares a common
ancestor with the decedent, but is neither an ancestor nor a descendant." WAGGONER ET
AL., supra note 28, at 69. Examples of collateral relatives include brothers, sisters, neph-
ews, nieces, aunts, uncles, and cousins. Id. at 88.
43. Browder, supra note 9, at 1312. But see CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6402(e) & 6402(g)
(West 1993) (allowing a predeceased spouse's issue, parents, or issue of parents to take by
intestacy) and discussion of relatives by affinity infra Part II.B.2.
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Many jurisdictions liberally allow a decedent's * "next of kin" or
"nearest kindred" to take by intestacy when no close relative survives
the decedent.44 Next of kin or nearest kindred normally refers to sur-
viving persons "who are most nearly related by blood [to the dece-
dent]. ' 45 Such persons may include the "laughing heir," who is one
who is "so loosely linked to his ancestor as to suffer no sense of be-
reavement at his loss."
46
Supporters of next of kin provisions, including the State Bar of
California, reason that "[ilt is doubtful that [a provision that would
cause property to escheat47 more often to the state by cutting off next
of kin] represents the intention of any person who dies intestate."48
Other rationales behind such provisions remain disappointingly
unarticulated.
One opponent of such schemes has asserted that "[t]he only ra-
tionale for this progression to remote kindred appears to be that any-
thing is better than escheat.149 Similarly, Professor Richard V.
Wellman, Chief Reporter for the Uniform Probate Code and former
Educational Director for the Joint Editorial Board,50 asserted that
"[t]ypical inheritance statutes that let relatives take ahead of the state
no matter how remote the blood connection may be have little justifi-
cation other than a long history that few have questioned."5'
Other opponents of next of kin provisions5 2 advocate cutting off
laughing heirs by limiting inheritance "to relatives whom the decedent
44. See, e.g., CAL. PROB CODE § 6402(f) (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-
103(l)(e) (1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 503(4) (1992); ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 755,
para. 2-1(g); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 190, § 3(6) (Law. Co-op. 1993); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-
103(4) (1992); Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-1-3 (1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-203(4) (1992);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2303(5) (1992); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2105.06(H) (Baldwin
1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 29-1-9 (1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-103 (1993);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 551(5) (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-1 (Michie 1993); and Wis.
STAT. § 852.01(2)(g) (1992).
45. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1044 (6th ed. 1990).
46. David F. Cavers, Change in the American Family and the "Laughing Heir," 20
IOWA L. REv. 203, 208 (1935).
47. Escheat is "[a] reversion of property to the state in consequence of a want of any
individual competent to inherit." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 545 (6th ed. 1990). See dis-
cussion of avoiding escheat infra Part. I.D.
48. UPC CRITQUE, supra note 28, at 29-30 (evaluating UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-103).
49. Browder, supra note 9, at 1312.
50. RICHARD V. WELLMAN, RESPONSE OF THE JOINT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE TO THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA'S "UNIFORM PROBATE
CODE: ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE" (1974) [hereinafter RESPONSE].
51. Id. at 6.
52. See e.g., 1 RICHARD T. ELY, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATIONS TO
THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 447 (1914) ("In the United States we still have the absurd
anachronism that in cases of intestacy a relative may inherit the property of a decedent, no
matter how distant the relationship.") (emphasis added); Perry Evans, Comments on the
Probate Code of California, 19 CAL. L. REv. 602, 613 (1931)
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probably knew and had an interest in"3 or who were dependent upon
or had the probable affection of the decedent.5 4 The opponents' ra-
tionale is that "the remotely related 'laughing heir' probably has a
weaker claim to the property than closer kin in terms of ties with the
intestate resulting from contacts with him."'5 5 In fact, even laughing
heirs sometimes view themselves as undeserving of decedents'
bounties.
5 6
In addition to the weakness of these heirs' claims, other ratio-
nales for cutting off laughing heirs include:
57
(1) It simplifies the administration of estates (and of trusts
where there is a final gift to "heirs") by avoiding the delay and ex-
pense of attempting to find remote missing heirs and by minimizing
problems of service of notice.
58
(2) It eliminates the standing of remote heirs to bring will con-
tests (or trust litigation) and thus minimizes the opportunity for un-
meritorious litigation brought for the sole purpose of coercing a
settlement.
59
titles3 It removes a significant source of uncertainty in land
There is no good reason why cousins, at any rate those beyond the fourth degree
of kinship, i.e., first cousins, should have any right of inheritance. Such distant
relatives have no such contact with the decedent as to make them dependent
upon him or to bring them within the circle of his warm affection.
See generally Atkinson, supra note 28, at 192-97 (proposing limitations on succession
among collaterals); Cavers, supra note 46, at 205 (predicting that changes in the structure
and life of the American family and considerations of convenience will lead to drastic limi-
tations on the right of remote kindred to succession upon intestacy).
53. California Law Revision Commission, supra note 10, at 2335. See also Sharon A.
DeWaele & Phillip J. Holman, Trusts, Annual Survey of Michigan Law June 1, 1988 - May
31, 1989, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1001, 1027 (1990) (quoting In re Estate of Jurek, 428 N.W.2d
774, 777 (1983)).
54. Atkinson, supra note 28, at 190. See also Evans, supra note 52, at 613.
55. Richard H. Power, Comparison of the Uniform Probate Code Provisions on Intes-
tacy and the Law of California, in COMPARATIVE PROBATE LAW STUDIES 3, 8 (1977).
56. See SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 144-45 (stating that "Laughing heirs have
been considered unworthy takers, and they saw themselves as such. They had rendered the
deceased no service of any kind; they could not justify their windfall to themselves. Unlike
Irish Sweepstakes winners, they did not even risk a shilling for their good fortune.").
57. Rationales (1) - (3) are quoted from California Law Revision Commission, supra
note 10, at 2335.
58. See Niles, supra note 10, at 200 n.98.
59. See Evans, supra note 52, at 613 (stating that useless, burdensome, and prolonged
litigation to establish relationship is occasionally brought in California by remote heirs
whom the decedent did not know and who did not know the decedent).
60. See Cavers, supra note 46, at 211 asserting that
a restriction of the class of those entitled to succession would remove an impor-
tant source of uncertainty in titles to land. Where a decedent leaves no close
kindred it is often difficult to ascertain whether the persons who first assert their
claim may not later be obliged to yield in precedence to the long lost cousin from
Australia.
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(4) [T]he enumerated relatives and, then the state are more
likely to care for [the] decedent [and are thus more deserving of
inheritance] than are the decedent's more remote relatives. 61
In sum, relatives by consanguinity are generally considered de-
serving, but other policy considerations render them less deserving as
their relationship with the intestate becomes more remote.
(2) Relatives by Affinity
A decedent's relatives by affinity 62 include blood or adopted rela-
tives of her spouse, such as her spouse's parents, siblings, or descend-
ants of siblings, and spouses of the decedent's blood or adopted
relatives, such as her daughters- and sons-in-law.63 Almost all intes-
tacy schemes exclude relatives by affinity,64 presumably based upon
the view that such relatives generally are not deserving and upon the
desire to keep intestacy schemes simple by limiting possible takers.
Jurisdictions that do allow relatives by affinity to take by intestacy
may base this allowance upon the idea that such relatives were proba-
bly close to the decedent and are therefore either more deserving of
the decedent's bounty than are the state65 or distant blood relatives or
equally as deserving as are the decedent's close blood relatives. For
example, the California Probate Code gives issue of a predeceased
spouse priority over the decedent's next of kin for succession to the
share of the intestate estate for heirs other than a surviving spouse.66
In addition, at least one commentator has proposed that natural chil-
dren and qualifying stepchildren should share equally in the intestate
estate if most intestates in qualifying families "would prefer to include
stepchildren in the category of children as heirs."67 It is the conten-
tion of this Note, as discussed more fully in Part III.B.1, that some
relatives by affinity are indeed deserving and should therefore be eli-
61. See DeWaele & Holman, supra note 53, at 1028.
62. Affinity is the "[r]elation which one spouse because of marriage has to blood rela-
tives of the other." BLAC's LAw DicTONARY 59 (6th ed. 1990).
63. WAGGONER ET Ai-, supra note 28, at 91.
64. See generally Mahoney, supra note 28, at 917-24 (noting how the law of intestate
succession ignores stepfamilies). But see discussion of CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6402(e) &
6402(g), supra note 43, and the following provisions for relatives by affinity: FLA. STAT. ch.
732.103(5) (1992); IOWA CODE § 633.219(4) (1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.010(6)
(Baldwin 1993); MD. CODE ANN., Esr. & TRUSTS § 3-104(e) (1993); Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 474.010(3) (1992); Omo REV. CODE ANNt. § 2105.06(I) (Baldwin 1993); and S.C. CODE
ANN. § 62-2-103(6) (Law. Co-op. 1993).
65. For a description and discussion of American statutes that allow stepchildren,
stepparents, and heirs of the decedent's deceased spouse to take by default to prevent
escheat when there are no "real" heirs (i.e, blood relatives of the decedent), see Mahoney,
supra note 28, at 920-22, 924.
66. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6402(e)-(f) (West 1993).
67. See Mahoney, supra note 28, at 938-39.
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gible to take by intestacy if they can substantiate their status as
deserving.
C. Limiting Delays, Expenses, and Liabilities Associated with the
Personal Representative's Duties of Locating and Notifying
Prospective Heirs
Another important goal in formulating any intestacy statute is to
minimize delays, expenses, and liabilities associated with the personal
representative's duties of locating and notifying prospective heirs.
68
Often described in deceptively simple terms, these duties 69 can gener-
ate a variety of problems for the personal representative and others
who are involved in or affected by probate proceedings, especially in
cases in which unrestricted inheritance by remote collaterals is al-
lowed.70 For example, failure to provide adequate notice may be a
violation of the heirs' constitutional rights to due process.71 However,
adherence to stringent notice requirements may result in lengthy de-
lays in probate proceedings because "the mobility of families in to-
day's society makes tracing remote relatives difficult" 72 or because of
"the internecine strife among competing claimants. '73 Moreover,
"[i]nvestigations to determine those entitled to succession may be
68. With respect to intestacy and other probate proceedings, the duties of locating and
providing notice to prospective heirs lie with the personal representative of the estate, who
is often called an executor or administrator. An administrator is "[a] person appointed by
the court to administer (i.e., manage or take charge of) the assets and liabilities of a dece-
dent .... If the person performing these probate services is named by the decedent's will,
he is designated as the executor, or she the executrix, of the estate." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 46 (6th ed. 1990). For the purpose of simplicity, this Note will hereinafter refer to
either an executor or an administrator as a personal representative.
69. Although beyond the scope of this Note, for a discussion and comparison of the
requirements of notice in probate and other proceedings, see Gary R. Cunningham, Due
Process-The Requirement of Notice in Probate Proceedings, 40 Mo. L. REv. 552 (1975).
Also, for a critique of the Uniform Probate Code no-notice probate and nonintervention
administration provisions see Charles J. Parker, No-Notice Probate and Non-Intervention
Administration Under the Code, 2 CONN. L. REv 546 (1970).
70. See Verner F. Chaffin, Descent and Distribution-Inheritable Property and Rela-
tive Rights of Heir and Administrator, in COMPARATIVE PROBATE LAW STUDIES 15, 35
(1977) ("Unrestricted inheritance by remote collaterals results in a time-consuming and
often wasteful search for missing or unknown blood relatives of the decedent.").
71. "The constitutional basis for the power or the right of a probate court to act in an
estate is the mailing, service, or publication of adequate notice of the initial petition to all
persons who are concerned. [31] The purpose of such notice is to inform persons who are
interested in the disposition of the property of the decedent so that they may have an
adequate opportunity to claim such property." 1 ARTHUR K. MARSHALL & ANDREW S.
GARB, CALIFORNIA PROBATE PROCEDURE WITH JUDICIAL COUNCIL FORMS § 501 (5th ed.
rev. 1991) (citations omitted).
72. Fisher & Curnutte, supra note 14, at 81.
73. Cavers, supra note 46, at 211.
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costly," 74 and "the cost of tracing, or attempting to trace, the remote
relatives is likely to deplete the decedent's estate." 75 Depletion of the
estate would defeat a significant purpose of probate, which is to dis-
tribute the decedent's assets to her heirs.
76
In determining how to remedy problems caused by inadequate
notice requirements, legislators should remember that "[p]rocedures
relating to settlement of estates should start from the assumption that
estates belong to the survivors.'77 Such an assumption makes obvious
the need for states to adopt the simplest notice requirements that
comport with due process. In states such as California, for example,
notice need only be given to known heirs, "to the heirs named in the
petition for letters of administration, 78 and to any additional heirs who
become known to the person giving the notice prior to the giving of
the notice. ' 79 However, in other states that lack such a relaxed statu-
tory provision, a personal representative generally must exert reason-
able diligence in locating a decedent's heirs.80 A personal
representative's errors and oversights in carrying out notice require-
ments could subject the personal representative to liability for negli-
gence and could also result in the imposition of a constructive trust81
upon the assets of an estate that were already distributed.82 These
74. Id.
75. Fisher & Curnutte, supra note 14, at 81.
76. See definition of "probate" in BLACK'S LAW DicrIoNARY 1202 (6th ed. 1990).
77. UPC DRAFr, supra note 3, at 7 (referring to the desirability of eliminating, to the
extent possible, involved court procedures relating to settlement of estates).
78. Letters of administration is a "tflormal document issued by [a] probate court ap-
pointing one an administrator of an estate." BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 905 (6th ed.
1990).
79. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1206 (West 1993).
80. J.D. Emerich, Annotation, Duty and Liability of Executor with Respect to Locat-
ing and Noticing Legatees, Devisees, or Heirs, 10 A.L.R. 3D 547, 548-49 (1993).
81. "A constructive trust is a relationship with respect to property subjecting the per-
son by whom the title to the property is held to an equitable duty to convey it to another
on the ground that his acquisition or retention of the property is wrongful and that he
would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain the property." BLACK'S LAW
DICrIONARY 315 (6th ed. 1990) (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 1(e)).
82. For example, in Shepherd v. Townsend, 162 So. 2d 878 (Miss. 1964), the decedent
left her personal estate to her nearest of kin, according to the laws of descent and
distribution, and a statute provided that the executor use reasonable diligence in
locating heirs under such circumstances .... [T]he executor was [found] guilty of
negligence in failing to locate the decedent's closest heir, and in distributing the
estate to a more remote heir, on the ground that the executor failed to exercise
reasonable diligence in not having an attorney investigate the decedent's family
tree.
10 A.L.R. 3D at 552-53. Compare Stevens v. Torregano, 13 Cal. Rptr. 604 (Ct. App. 1961),
in which "ignorance on the part of an executor of the existence of a pretermitted heir was
not, legally, a 'mistake' authorizing the imposition of a constructive'trust upon the assets of
an estate already distributed, since it was a general rule that an executor was under no duty
to search out unknown heirs." 10 A.L.R. 3D at 551 (discussing Stevens v. Torregano).
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undesirable consequences, coupled with efficiency considerations, re-
inforce the need for both simple notice requirements and limited in-
heritance among collaterals.
D. Avoiding Frequent Escheat
Although escheat seldom occurs, especially in jurisdictions that
allow inheritance by remote collaterals or by relatives by affinity, the
desirability of frequent escheat has been studied and debated. As ex-
plained in this subpart, it is desirable to limit the frequency of escheat
because deserving relatives generally will benefit more than the state
will from intestate succession to the same size estate and because
modem intestates probably would prefer that their property pass to
their deserving relatives rather than to the state.
Some commentators who favor escheat have argued that an intes-
tate's presumed views about escheat should be disregarded because
"[i]t is fruitless to debate about the probable intention of intestate
decedents [who die] without close relatives. After all, the decedent
can leave a will to direct his property away from the state."8 3
In a similar vein, Professor David F. Cavers asserted a positive
view of escheat in his 1931 article entitled Change in the American
Family and the "Laughing Heir. "4 In that article, Professor Cavers
argued that intestates may not be as reluctant as they once were to
allow escheat rather than succession to remote collateral relatives be-
cause "[t]he state, which would be the most immediate beneficiary of
... [a reform that would cut off laughing heirs], has come to achieve a
place less antagonistic to the individual citizen than it has occupied
since the breakdown of the feudal organization of society."8 5 Further,
Professor Cavers suggested that it might be desirable to devote a por-
tion of escheated property to uses localized in the decedent's domi-
cile.86 Professor Cavers concluded, "If such a provision were made, it
is not unreasonable to suppose that many persons, having no relatives
within the privileged degrees, would be content to allow their prop-
erty to devolve upon the state." 87
Other commentators have posited that a provision that fre-
quently causes property to escheat to the state 88 probably does not
83. RESPONSE, supra note 50, at 6.
84. See generally Cavers, supra note 46.
85. Id. at 210.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 210-11.
88. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-103, which excludes relatives more remote than
descendants from a grandparent of the decedent. RESPONSE, supra note 50, at 5. Uniform
Probate Code § 2-103 "provides for inheritance by lineal descendants of the decedent, par-
ents and their descendants, and grandparents and collateral relatives descended from
grandparents; in line with modem policy, it eliminates more remote relatives tracing
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represent the intention of persons who die intestate.89 Although con-
trary to Professor Cavers' view, this position probably is more reflec-
tive of the realities of modem American society, in which increasing
reluctance to pay taxes and other fees to the government implies in-
creasing reluctance to benefit the state through escheat.
This position against escheat is also consistent with the results of
a 1978 study of Iowans' dispositive preferences in which only 10 per-
cent of 485 live interviewees hypothetically preferred escheat to the
state education fund if only a stepparent and a distant relative whom
they had never met survived them.90 In addition, this position com-
ports with the sociobiological view of escheat, which postulates that
for genetic reasons intestates would prefer to benefit fairly distant
blood relatives through inheritance rather than the general public
through escheat.91 Finally, this position against escheat has been sup-
through great-grandparents." UPC DRAFr, supra note 3, at 67; UNri. PROB. CODE OF'I-
crAL TExT Wm-I CoMMENTs 24 (West 1969); and UNin. PROB. CODE OFFICL 1991 TEX-r
Wrri COMMENTS 48 (10th ed. West 1991).
89. See supra text accompanying note 48. See also Power, supra note 55, at 9 (assert-
ing that "it cannot be denied that most people who own property do not want it to
escheat.").
90. Contemporary Studies Project, supra note 9, at 1119. The detailed study results
were as follows: (1) 45% would give all to the stepparent; (2) 3% would give all to the
distant relative; (3) 22% would divide the estate between the stepparent and the distant
relative; (4) 9% would give all to friends; (5) 10% would give all to the state education
fund; (6) 3% did not care; and (7) 9% would give all to others. Id. at 1118. The study's
authors also noted that only 25% of the interviewees allocated any portion of the estate to
the distant relative and only 10% were amenable to escheat to the state education fund.
See id. at 1119.
In 1981 the Iowa study's results were analyzed by Professor John H. Beckstrom in
terms of reciprocal altruism and nepotism, two aspects of sociobiological theory. See gen-
erally Beckstrom, supra note 9. "In reciprocal altruism, the altruist is doing something to
benefit another in anticipation that someone will return the favor." Id at 222-23. In nepo-
tism, which is based upon a high percentage of genetic overlap between the nepotist and a
relative, the nepotist benefits the relative at a cost to the nepotist's ability to reproduce, or
perhaps even to live, though the relative probably will not return the favor. Id. at 224.
Professor Beckstrom reconciled the Iowa study's results as follows: "[R]eciprocal al-
truism impulses pointing to stepparents and friends would be stronger than the nepotistic
impulses in favor of distant relatives" whom the interviewee has never met. Id. at 257.
Further, although a stepparent and friends are no more closely related to the interviewees
than the beneficiaries of the state education fund, the stepparent and friends "are much
more likely to have an ongoing reciprocating aid arrangement with a respondent than is a
distant relative whom the respondent has never met." Id.
91. Professor Beckstrom summarized the sociobiological view of escheat by stating:
There may be good, practical, cultural reasons for [a scheme that provides for
escheat after the grandparents' lines are exhausted without finding a survivor],
but the Selfish Genes would be whispering the following simplistic protest to
lawmakers through the medium of our hypnotized intestates: "The resources of
our gene survival vehicle are not being used to assist us in getting into succeeding
generations. Worse than that, they are being applied so as to assist our competi-
tors in other survival vehicles!"
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ported by at least one creative court, in circumvention of the highly
statutory nature of intestate succession law, when remote blood rela-
tives survived a decedent and the legislature failed to adequately de-
fine the term "heir." 92
Notwithstanding the views of intestates, commentators, and
courts toward escheat, whether and how often escheat can occur is
determined by state law.93 Some states, such as California, provide
little opportunity for escheat, preferring that intestate estates pass to
relatives by consanguinity or affinity. Other states provide greater op-
portunity for escheat, reasoning that "[i]n an expanding welfare soci-
ety, where the government performs more and more services for its
citizens and assumes responsibilities which in earlier days rested upon
the family, it is at least arguable that the state should benefit at the
expense of remote next of kin."'94
The California approach that limits escheat is preferable to the
latter approach because individuals may benefit substantially through
inheritance of even a modest estate while a state would benefit rela-
tively minimally through escheat of the same estate. Under either ap-
proach, a state should ensure fairness to heirs who were not properly
notified of probate proceedings by affording a reasonable postprobate
Beckstrom, supra note 9, at 256. For a general explanation of the relationship between
sociobiological theory and intestacy, see supra note 90.
92. See In re Estate of Brunel, 600 A.2d 123 (N.H. 1991). In Brunel, second cousins
related to the decedent through a common great-grandfather took by intestacy despite the
provision in the New Hampshire statutory scheme that limited inheritance to those claim-
ing through the grandparent or issue of grandparent line. The statutory scheme explicitly
required that "there be no heir" before escheat could occur, but the scheme failed to de-
fine the term "heir." Id. at 127. Consequently, the New Hampshire Supreme Court re-
sorted to a common law scheme of descent and distribution borrowed from the English
Statute of Distributions. See Richard R. Volkmer, Escheat Prevented by Using Common
Law, 19 EsT. PLAN. 250 (1992) (analyzing In re Estate of Brunel as an example of how
courts have gone to unusual lengths to avoid escheat when remote blood relatives survive a
decedent). Use of the common law scheme, which acknowledged all collaterals and pre-
ferred the nearer to the more remote, coupled with use of the state statutory scheme that
did not expressly prohibit distribution to second cousins, allowed the court to avoid escheat
by allowing the decedent's remote relatives to take by intestacy. See Brunel, 600 A.2d at
127.
93. Cavers, supra note 46, at 210-11 (stating that "[s]uccession to intestate property is
at the will of ... the state in which it is situated.").
94. Chaffin, supra note 70, at 36. See also Atkinson, supra note 28, at 194 ("It is
reasonable therefore that the state should receive the property of an intestate who leaves
no kindred close enough to have meritorious claim to inherit his property. The costs of
education, highways, and more recently, extensive relief to the unemployed create de-
mands on the treasury which escheats might help to satisfy.") and ELY, supra note 52, at
432 ("The duty of support, which once rested upon distant relatives, has now passed over
to society and is incorporated in the state; and as society has taken some of the obligations,
it is only proper for society to claim some of the rights which formerly belonged to the
family.").
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grace period during which heirs can step in and claim their shares
prior to permanent vesting of the property in the state.95
E. Fostering Uniformity with Intestacy Schemes of Other States
Like the desirability of escheat, the need for the adoption of na-
tionally uniform intestacy schemes has also been debated. Proponents
of uniformity focus their argument upon the increased mobility of per-
sons in modem society,96 asserting that the simplification of intestate
succession law that could be achieved through uniformity would serve
the public interest 97 because "[m]obile Americans are more likely to
be served by uniform rules of heirship, than by one or another view[s]
from particular states to the effect that residents there intend what the
local rules always have provided. '9
3
Despite the plausibility of this assertion, opponents of national
uniformity for its own sake have the stronger argument. For instance,
the State Bar of California firmly and confidently contended in 1973
that adoption of the Uniform Probate Code in its entirety would not
have constituted an improvement over the State's existing probate
system because the California Probate Code contained many desira-
ble provisions. 99 Moreover, the Bar argued that adoption of Uniform
Probate Code section 2-103, which cuts off remote collateral relatives
who take as heirs other than the surviving spouse in California, would
95. For example, the California Probate Code provides a five-year period in which
qualified persons may claim escheated property. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 11903 (West
1993). See also 2 ARTHUR K. MARSHALL & ANDREw S. GARJ3, CALiFORNA PROBATE
PROCEDURE wITH JUDICIAL CoUNcIL FoRms § 1925 (5th ed. rev. 1991) (under California
Probate Code section 11903, "any person entitled to the property may claim it within five
years from the date of the decree of distribution; if none so claims, such property vests
absolutely in the state").
96. For example, Professor Wellman commented:
[IThe day when we can afford to have different probate laws in fifty states has
passed. People no longer live and die in one location of the country with the
frequency of former times. Estates are more likely than not to involve assets or
survivors located in several states. Lawyers need to be able to predict the state
laws and procedures of other states and clients need to be relieved of the neces-
sity to recast estate plans with every change of domicile or new acquisition of out-
of-state land. The present variance in state laws which requires replanning of
wills with each inter-state move or acquisition is not only a nuisance, it's probably
a positive hindrance to the free mobility of capital among the several states.
UPC DRAFr, supra note 3, at 6.
97. Power, supra note 55, at 9.
98. REsPONSE, supra note 50, at 4. See also id. at 6 ("It may be doubted that Califor-
nians generally have different intentions... [with respect to the possibility of inheritance
by remote relatives] than the residents of other states.") and Power, supra note 55, at 9-10
("An argument that a particular state's popular feelings are different from those generally
prevailing would be indeed difficult to substantiate.").
99. UPC CRIQUE, supra note 28, at xxxiv.
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have brought about "a very substantial change in California law"'100
that would have affected the great majority of attorney-prepared wills
in the state.' 0' In the Bar's estimation, the anticipated effect of this
drastic change was negative because intestate property would, con-
trary to the presumed intention of many intestates,' o2 escheat more
often to the state.'0 3 Thus, although uniformity may be beneficial to
mobile intestates, it should not be pursued blindly without serious
consideration of its potential consequences on existing laws, wills, and
expectations of decedents.
11I. A Proposed Intestacy Statute
This Part proposes a model intestacy statute for heirs who are not
the surviving spouse. Consistent with the background information
and criteria discussed in Parts I and II of this Note, the statute satisfies
each of the major modern intestacy goals and promotes a variety of
beneficial effects discussed in Part III.B below.
A. The Proposed Statute
Intestate Share of Heirs Other than the Surviving Spouse:
Any part of the intestate estate not passing to the surviving
spouse, or the entire intestate estate if there is no surviving spouse,
passes as follows:
(a) to the decedent's surviving descendant(s), in the manner
provided by [the probate code section prescribing the jurisdiction's
method of representation]. 1' 4
(b) if there is no survivor under subsection (a), to the dece-
dent's parent or parents equally.
(c) if there is no survivor under subsections (a) or (b), to the
descendants of the decedent's parent(s) in the manner provided by
[the probate code section prescribing the jurisdiction's method of
representation].
(d) if there is no survivor under subsections (a) through (c), to
the decedent's grandparent or grandparents equally.
(e) if there is no survivor under subsections (a) through (d), to
the descendants of the decedent's grandparent(s) in the manner
100. See CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF =m BAR, IMPACT OF CALIFOR-
NIA'S PROBATE CODE REFORM 250 (1984).
101. See i&t at 251 (noting that "a great majority of wills prepared by attorneys incorpo-
rate the California intestate succession law").
102. See supra notes 48 and 89 and accompanying text.
103. UPC CRITIQUE, supra note 28, at 30.
104. Although beyond the scope of this Note, there are a variety of methods used to
determine the proper distribution of intestate property among relatives who are not among
the same degree of kinship to a decedent. For a discussion of some of these methods of
representation among descendants, see WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 28, at 79-86.
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provided by [the probate code section describing the jurisdiction's
method of representation].
(f) if there is no survivor under subsections (a) through (e),
equally to the nearest lineal ascendants of the decedent's grandpar-
ents; if there are no such lineal ascendants, equally to the surviving
siblings of such ascendants.
(g) if there is no survivor under subsections (a) through (f), to
the decedent's next of kin who show clear and convincing evidence
of a cordial relationship with the decedent.
(h) if there is no eligible survivor under subsections (a) through
(g), equally to the surviving relatives of the decedent's predeceased
spouse who show clear and convincing evidence of a cordial rela-
tionship with the decedent.
B. Rationale for the Proposed Statute
The proposed statute is designed to achieve modem intestacy
goals in a complete yet comprehensible fashion. Beneficial effects of
the statute, described in detail below, include: (1) allowing an intes-
tate's "deserving" relatives by consanguinity and affinity to take by
intestacy; (2) protecting an intestate's financially dependent family
members; (3) reducing the potential for unmeritorious claims; (4) lim-
iting delays, expenses, and liabilities related to notice; (5) avoiding fre-
quent escheat; and (6) fostering uniformity without sacrificing
beneficial uniqueness.
(1) Allowing Deserving Relatives to Take by Intestacy
First and foremost, the proposed statute has an exceptionally
strong capacity for allowing an intestate's deserving relatives' 05-and
only those deserving relatives-to take by intestacy. This capacity is
reflected in whom the statute includes and excludes from inheritance
eligibility. The statute includes a broad group of relatives by consan-
guinity and affinity, which consists of the intestate's: (a) descendants,
(b) parents, (c) descendants of parents, (d) grandparents, (e) descend-
ants of grandparents, (f) lineal ascendants of grandparents or the sib-
lings of such ascendants, (g) next of kin who show clear and
convincing evidence of a cordial relationship with the intestate, and
(h) relatives of the predeceased spouse who show clear and convinc-
ing evidence of a cordial relationship with the intestate. The statute
excludes the vast group of remote relatives descending from both the
lineal ascendants of grandparents and the siblings of such ascendants
unless such relatives provide clear and convincing evidence of a cor-
dial relationship with the intestate. A cordial relationship, as dis-
cussed more fully throughout the remainder of this subpart, is one
105. For an in-depth discussion of deserving relatives, see discussion supra Part ll.B.
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that is evidenced by a history of amicable correspondence or meetings
between the intestate and the potential heir.
Few legislators would quarrel with an assertion that an intestate's
relatives in subsections (a) through (e) deserve to take by intestacy.
The rationale is that such relatives probably are within the decedent's
"affection-support" circle, that is, they are persons whom the dece-
dent knew and had an interest in or who depended on or had the
affection of the decedent.106 Likewise, although Uniform Probate
Code supporters would probably disagree,10 7 relatives in subsections
(f) and (g) may be equally if not more deserving of an intestate's
bounty than some of the relatives in subsections (a) through (e). To
illustrate, it seems more likely that great-grandparents, great-aunts,
and great-uncles (subsection (f) relatives) s08 would be in the intes-
tate's affection-support circle than that distant descendants of the in-
testate's grandparents, such as first cousins twice or thrice removed
(subsection (e) relatives), would be in the circle.
The proposed statute provides that in those rare cases in which
no relative in subsections (a) through (g) survives the intestate, rela-
tives of the intestate's predeceased spouse become eligible to take by
intestacy under subsection (h) if those relatives can show clear and
convincing evidence of a cordial relationship with the intestate.
Although few states currently allow relatives by affinity to inherit, 10 9
the proposed statute allows this because relatives who could meet the
burden of persuasion are probably within the affection-support circle
of the intestate. In fact, these relatives by affinity are likely to be
closer to the intestate than are many of her remote next of kin' 10 or
the public at large" 1 who would succeed to the estate if relatives by
affinity were not allowed to inherit. Moreover, the fact that relatives
by affinity cannot take unless there are no surviving eligible relatives
by consanguinity reflects the prevailing notion that an intestate's
106. See generally discussion supra Part II.B.1 (describing relatives by consanguinity as
one group of relatives believed to be deserving).
107. The Uniform Probate Code cuts off remote relatives tracing through great-grand-
parents. See supra note 88.
108. Because of longevity considerations, the surviving group of subsection (f) rela-
tives, if it exists at all, will in most instances be limited to one or more of the intestate's
great-grandparents, great-aunts, or great-uncles rather than more remote ancestors of the
decedent's grandparents.
109. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
110. In California, for example, next of kin are eligible to take by intestacy no matter
how remote their relationship to the intestate. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402(f) (West
1993).
111. For example, the Uniform Probate Code allows escheat rather than succession by
collaterals more remote than those tracing through the intestate's grandparents. See supra
note 88.
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blood relatives are more deserving of inheritance than are her
steprelatives.
As a final comment on the proposed statute's strong capacity for
allowing an intestate's deserving relatives to take by intestacy, the
statute's requirement that next of kin show clear and convincing evi-
dence of a cordial relationship with the intestate will ensure that any
remote kin who take by intestacy will indeed be deserving of their
prizes, that is, such kin will not be laughing heirs. Possible criticisms
of this provision are (1) that inclusion of remote kin as possible heirs
will encourage litigation and (2) that the high burden of persuasion
will lengthen and complicate any such litigation. The responses to
these criticisms are (1) that litigation with respect to this provision will
be rare because the provision itself will apply only in unusual in-
stances in which closer blood relatives do not survive the intestate and
(2) that the high burden of persuasion can easily be complied with in
cases in which the remote kin are truly deserving 1 2 and may dissuade
those with weak relationships to the intestate from pursuing unmer-
itorious claims.
(2) Protecting Financially Dependent Family Members
The proposed statute protects an intestate's financially dependent
family members 1 3 by making such members eligible to take by intes-
tacy either as of right, if the members fall within categories (a)
through (f), or upon proper proof, if the members fall within category
(g). This achievement is important not only to the members pro-
tected, who often include the intestate's minor children 14 and perhaps
her aging parents, but also to the state and other relatives of the intes-
tate who would otherwise become responsible for her financially de-
pendent relatives in her absence.
(3) Reducing the Potential for Unmeritorious Claims
Subsection (g)'s requirement that next of kin show clear and con-
vincing evidence of a cordial relationship with the intestate reduces
the potential for unmeritorious litigation brought by kin who clearly
cannot meet that burden, such as those whom the intestate obviously
did not know or like. This reduction in litigation could save a signifi-
cant amount of time and resources of the court, attorneys, and others
112. Decisions as to whether the burden of persuasion has been met might be left
solely to the probate court's discretion. Alternately, a state adopting the proposed intes-
tacy statute might adopt an additional statute that prescribes the bases upon which the
court's decision should rest. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6451 (West 1994) (prescribing
the eligibility requirements for inheritance based upon equitable adoption).
113. See generally supra note 35 and accompanying text.
114. See supra text accompanying note 20.
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involved in probate proceedings in which close relatives fail to survive
the intestate while still preserving the opportunity for deserving kin to
prove the requisite relationship and take by intestacy. It should be
noted that although proving the requisite relationship would consume
time, the time required would be minimal in the most meritorious
cases and probably only moderate in the most questionable cases be-
cause of the variety and potentially simple nature of the proof that
might be offered, such as evidence of amicable written correspon-
dence between the claimant and the intestate, or perhaps photographs
or other evidence of recent cordial activities in which the claimant and
intestate had engaged together.
(4) Limiting Delays, Expenses, and Liabilities Related to Notice
Subsection (g) of the proposed statute could limit the delays, ex-
penses, and liabilities associated with the personal representative's du-
ties of locating and notifying prospective heirs. This beneficial
limitation would stem from the statute's indirect relaxation of the
"reasonable diligence" standard commonly used in notice statutes to
describe the personal representative's duty to locate an intestate's
heirs. 115 The relaxation would occur because the personal representa-
tive could limit her search to only those kin who appear to have, at a
bare minimum, at least interacted with the intestate and would thus
have some chance of establishing the proof of a cordial relationship.
Consequently, the personal representative would be relieved of the
costly duty of, and potential liability associated with, searching exten-
sive family trees to locate even those relatives who did not know and
were unknown by the intestate.
(5) Avoiding Frequent Escheat
Subsections (f), (g), and (h) of the proposed statute avoid fre-
quent escheat by extending eligibility for inheritance to the intestate's
remote, yet nevertheless deserving, blood relatives and to her deserv-
ing relatives by affinity. As discussed in Part II.D, avoidance of es-
cheat in this manner can allow one or more deserving relatives to
benefit substantially through inheritance of even a modest estate
rather than allowing the state to benefit minimally through escheat of
the same estate. It should also be mentioned that the statute does not
attempt to avoid escheat altogether simply for the purpose of avoiding
escheat. 116 Rather, the statute allows deserving relatives to take in
preference to the state. If there are no deserving relatives, then the
statute allows the state to take in preference to distant, undeserving
115. See discussion supra Part II.C.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
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relatives that would otherwise take under a typical statute providing
for unlimited inheritance among collaterals.
(6) Fostering Uniformity Without Sacrificing. Uniqueness
The proposed statute fosters uniformity between itself and intes-
tacy statutes of many jurisdictions without sacrificing the content of its
own special features. The statute is composed of subsections (a)
through (e), which are similar in substance and arrangement to sub-
sections currently found in many jurisdictions, and subsections (f)
through (h), which are wholly unique provisions.
Inclusion of the popularly adopted subsections fosters uniformity
between the proposed statute and the statutes of many jurisdictions.
This uniformity is desirable because it creates predictability for mobile
Americans who rely on their state's intestacy statutes to dispose of
part or all of their property at death.117 At the same time, inclusion of
the unique subsections is desirable because they achieve the highly
beneficial effects discussed above.
As a final observation, because of the wide range of possible heirs
included under the popularly adopted subsections (a) through (e),
most intestacy cases will be resolved under the popularly adopted sub-
sections without resort to the unique subsections (f) through (h).
Consequently, the predictability benefits can be realized in most cases
in which predictability is desirable, and the unique benefits of subsec-
tions (f) through (h) can be realized when the popularly adopted sub-
sections do not apply.
Conclusion
The laws of intestate succession are, and should be, of great con-
cern to the public. Intestacy statutes affect not only decedents who
die without comprehensive and valid wills or who rely on intestate
succession to dispose of their property, but also the surviving relatives
of such decedents, the state, and the public at large.
Intestacy provisions for heirs who are not the surviving spouse
are of particular concern because these provisions often dispose of the
bulk of an intestate or testate estate. Modern goals that underlie
these provisions include: allowing an intestate's "deserving" relatives
by consanguinity and affinity to take by intestacy; satisfying a dece-
dent's presumed intentions and society's interests; limiting delays, ex-
penses, and liabilities associated with the personal representative's
duties of locating and notifying prospective heirs; fostering simplicity,
comprehensibility, and uniformity of intestacy statutes; and avoiding
frequent escheat.
117. See discussion supra Part HE.
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To date, no state legislature has adequately promoted each of
these goals within its intestacy provision for heirs other than the sur-
viving spouse. It is likely that this inadequacy results from the failure
of legislators to conduct fundamental analyses of each of these goals
prior to adopting or revising provisions for heirs who are not the sur-
viving spouse. Use of the goal-based approach prescribed in this Note
will ensure that new or revised intestacy statutes promote achieve-
ment of the beneficial effects that underlie modern intestacy goals,
thus serving the interests of both the decedent and those who survive
her.
